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Learning through reward is central to adaptive behavior. Indeed, items are remembered bet-
ter if they are experienced while participants expect a reward, and people can deliberately
prioritize memory for high- over low-valued items. Do memory advantages for high-valued
items only emerge after deliberate prioritization in encoding? Or, do reward-based mem-
ory enhancements also apply to unrewarded memory tests and to implicit memory? First,
we tested for a high-value memory advantage in unrewarded implicit- and explicit-tests
(Experiment 1). Participants first learned high or low-reward values of 36 words, followed
by unrewarded lexical decision and free-recall tests. High-value words were judged faster
in lexical decision, and more often recalled in free recall. These two memory advantages
for high-value words were negatively correlated suggesting at least two mechanisms by
which reward value can influence later item-memorability. The ease with which the values
were originally acquired explained the negative correlation: people who learned values ear-
lier showed reward effects in implicit memory whereas people who learned values later
showed reward effects in explicit memory. We then asked whether a high-value advantage
would persist if trained items were linked to a new context (Experiments 2a and 2b). Fol-
lowing the same value training as in Experiment 1, participants learned lists composed of
previously trained words mixed with new words, each followed by free recall. Thus, par-
ticipants had to retrieve words only from the most recent list, irrespective of their values.
High- and low-value words were recalled equally, but low-value words were recalled earlier
than high-value words and high-value words were more often intruded (proactive interfer-
ence). Thus, the high-value advantage holds for implicit- and explicit-memory, but comes
with a side effect: High-value items are more difficult to relearn in a new context. Similar
to emotional arousal, reward value can both enhance and impair memory.
Keywords: reward, value, context, free recall, lexical decision, implicit memory, explicit memory
1. INTRODUCTION
When faced with items of differing reward values, an individual
has the possibility of prioritizing their efforts to learn as much
as possible about the higher-valued items, likely at the expense
of knowledge about the lower-value items. If people took advan-
tage of this, they could maximize their accumulation of reward.
In seeking reward, it may not only be beneficial to remember the
values of items, but also related information such as the precise
context in which the item was found, which we refer to as the
reward-maximization hypothesis. Alternatively, reward value may
be emotionally arousing; thus, effects of reward value on memory
may resemble those found with emotional arousal. Emotionally
arousing items are generally remembered better, but memory for
related contextual information is often impaired (Easterbrook,
1959; Burke et al., 1992; Christianson, 1992; Mather and Suther-
land, 2011; Madan et al., 2012). Such impairment may be caused by
diverting attention toward the arousing stimulus itself, and away
from its context. If reward value functions like emotional arousal,
then higher reward value should result in enhanced performance
on some tests of memory (e.g., memory for the experienced
items alone), but not others (e.g., judging whether an item was
presented in a specific context), which we refer to here as the value-
interference hypothesis. Whether higher reward value universally
results in better item-memory across different types of memory
tests (explicit and implicit), and whether reward value results in
better memory for context is unknown. Finding a benefit for high-
value items in rewarded memory tests tells us that participants
are capable of prioritizing high-value items, but leaves open the
question of whether participants favor high-value items when the
procedure does not dictate that they should do so. Thus, our first
objective was to test whether a memory advantage for words that
were previously trained to have a high (versus a low) reward value
persists in later unrewarded implicit- and explicit-memory tests
(Experiment 1), to test for the generality of reward-value enhance-
ments. Our second objective was to test whether an item-memory
advantage for high-value words generalizes if the trained words
have to be studied and memorized in a new context (Experiments
2a and 2b).
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Rewarded memory tests in numerous studies have shown that
people are able to prioritize learning of high-value over low-value
items, both words and images (Harley, 1965; Tarpy and Glucks-
berg, 1966; Weiner, 1966; Weiner and Walker, 1966; Loftus and
Wickens, 1970; Bjork and Woodward, 1973; Eysenck and Eysenck,
1982; Castel et al., 2002, 2007, 2009; Adcock et al., 2006; Gruber
and Otten, 2010; Kuhl et al., 2010; Shohamy and Adcock, 2010;
Soderstrom and McCabe, 2011; Wolosin et al., 2012; Watkins and
Bloom, unpublished manuscript). For example Castel et al. (2002),
showed participants words along with numerical reward values
ranging from 1 to 12. Participants were instructed to remember the
words with the highest values as best as possible, to maximize the
total value of their recalled words. High-value words were recalled
more than low-value words. This suggests people were able to flex-
ibly adjust the allocation of cognitive resources during learning to
favor items with higher value over those with lower value, and thus
maximize earned reward. Assuming a limited resource model, the
authors also suggested that if a particular item is allocated more
resources, it will be remembered better, but at the expense of the
other studied items.
Prioritization effects are not limited to recall; Adcock et al.
(2006) demonstrated an enhancement of memory due to reward
value using a different explicit memory test: recognition. They pre-
sented participants with a high- or low-value reward cue (“$5.00”
or “$0.10”) followed by a scene image. Participants were asked to
remember the scenes (presented during reward anticipation) and
were told that they would earn the respective reward amount if they
successfully recognized the images in a memory task the follow-
ing day. In the recognition test, participants earned the respective
reward for recognition hits, and were penalized for false alarms. Hit
rates were higher for high- than low-value items. Again, this result
demonstrates people’s ability to explicitly prioritize items asso-
ciated with a higher-value reward over those with a lower-value
reward, both during encoding and retrieval.
Such enhancements of memory due to reward value have been
found with tests of explicit memory. However, reward value could
influence implicit memory in equally powerful ways. That is,
reward value might modulate behavior even when the participant
is not deliberately trying to retrieve item-values. This would extend
the prioritization findings beyond a deliberate encoding/retrieval
strategy, and would suggest that in addition, participants may have
a cognitive bias toward high-value items. Although it has never
been tested directly, some findings are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that higher reward values lead to better implicit memory:
Rewards that are presented subliminally can influence behavior
(reviewed in Custers and Aarts, 2010). For example, participants
respond more quickly (∼20 ms) in simple monetary incentive
tasks when the trial is preceded by a high-value reward cue, than
if it is preceded by a low-value reward cue (e.g., the participant is
presented with the reward cue, and told to press a button once a
target appears; Abler et al., 2005; Sescousse et al., 2010; Staudinger
et al., 2011). Furthermore Pessiglione et al. (2007), presented par-
ticipants with coin images of either 1-pound or 1-pence and asked
them to squeeze a handgrip to earn the corresponding monetary
reward. Coin images were presented either subliminally (for 17 or
50 ms) or supraliminally (100 ms). Participants squeezed the grip
harder on the higher-value trials, even when the coin image was
not consciously perceived. Hence, consciously and unconsciously
processed reward cues can have analogous effects. Subliminally
presented higher-value rewards also recruited more attention than
lower-value rewards (pupil dilation: Bijleveld et al., 2009) and
increased accuracy in arithmetic (Bijleveld et al., 2010). Though
none of these studies have directly shown that reward value can
enhance implicit memory, they provide at least indirect support
for the hypothesis that high-value items could enhance implicit
memory.
We also wanted to clearly separate the value-learning phase,
which should be rewarded by necessity, from the later memory
phase, which should be unrewarded. Our reasoning was as follows:
to interpret the prioritization effects, one must consider that par-
ticipants were instructed to prioritize. The positive prioritization
results, therefore, tell us that participants are capable of prioriti-
zation. We ask here whether participants have a bias toward better
memory for higher-value stimuli in an unrewarded memory test,
even when there is no immediate need to favor the encoding of
high-value stimuli. By clearly separating the value-learning phase
from the memory study phase (Experiments 2a and 2b) and test
phase (all experiments here), we can test whether people possess
a learning bias universally favoring high over low-reward value
items or reward value might interfere with new learning.
Raymond and O’Brien (2009) conducted an experiment along
these lines, testing for the non-deliberate effects of reward value
on memory (see also Wittmann et al., 2005, 2011), but it is dif-
ficult to determine whether their results were driven by implicit-
or explicit-memory retrieval. In their value-learning task, stimu-
lus values were learned with repeated experience, and the effects
of the learned values on memory were later tested with an unre-
warded, modified attentional blink (AB) task. Participants were
first presented with pairs of faces and asked to choose one. Faces
within-pair differed in their probability of reward (0.20 or 0.80;
reward value across pairs was positive, negative, or neutral). Unlike
a conventional AB task, Raymond and O’Brien (2009) asked par-
ticipants not simply to respond when they saw the target image, but
instead to indicate whether the target image was an old face from
the prior value-learning task, or a new face (i.e., old/new recog-
nition). If a target image were to overcome the AB, it may also
be better retrieved in explicit recognition-memory. Higher-value
faces were indeed more often recognized as old than lower-value
faces, even though, critically, performance in this task was unre-
warded. Raymond and O’Brien (2009) concluded that more atten-
tional resources are recruited for stimuli that previously acquired a
higher value. Their results also demonstrate a prioritization from
a value-learning task where target items are encoded incidentally.
However, we suggest that the following interpretations are possi-
ble: (a) High-value faces were primed more during value-learning,
leading to enhanced implicit memory for higher-value faces dur-
ing the AB task. Greater priming for the higher-value faces may
have led to increases in subjective experiences of familiarity in the
recognition-memory test in the AB task. (b) Old/new recogni-
tion is a test of explicit memory. Participants may have recognized
the high-value faces in the AB task due to episodic recollection
(i.e., explicit memory). (c) Recognition in the AB task may have
resulted from a combination of implicit- and explicit-memory.
Thus, while Raymond and O’Brien’s results provide evidence of a
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reward-based enhancement of recognition-memory, it is unclear
whether this was an enhancement of implicit- or explicit-memory
or a mixture both.
In the current study, we first asked if previously learned reward
values also enhance item accessibility in an implicit test of mem-
ory: lexical decision (Experiment 1). Participants were first pre-
sented with words in a two-alternative choice value-learning task,
in which they learned, by trial-and-error with feedback, that half
of the words led to a high-value reward and half of the words led to
a low-value reward (also used by Madan and Spetch, 2012). This
value-learning task is similar to previous reward-learning proce-
dures used by Estes and others (e.g., Pubols, 1960; Estes, 1962,
1966, 1972; Humphreys et al., 1968; Allen and Estes, 1972; Medin,
1972a,b) as well several more recent reward-learning studies (e.g.,
Johnsrude et al., 1999, 2000; Frank et al., 2004, 2006; Bayley et al.,
2005; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Valentin and O’Doherty, 2009; Voon
et al., 2010; Gradin et al., 2011). Participants were then presented
with an unrewarded lexical decision task, in which words from the
value-learning task were shown again. Finally, in an unrewarded
test, participants were asked to freely recall all the words from
the session (value-learning phase and lexical decision). We pre-
dicted that explicit memory (free recall) would be enhanced by
reward value. We further predicted that implicit memory would
be enhanced due to reward value, as measured in the lexical deci-
sion task, if reward value enhances memory retrieval even when
participants do not deliberately prioritize the retrieval of high-
value items over low-value items. If memory is enhanced in both
memory tests, we will then ask whether the two effects could have
the same underlying cause or not. This will be done by correlating
the high-value advantage in lexical decision with the high-value
advantage in free recall across participants. If the correlation is
large and positive, this would suggest that memory, both implicit
and explicit, can be enhanced by reward value through a sin-
gular mechanism that globally enhances memory performance.
However, implicit- and explicit-memory functions are supported
by separable memory systems, both in behavior (e.g., May et al.,
2005; Gopie et al., 2011) and in the brain (e.g., Rugg et al., 1998;
Schott et al., 2005, 2006). If we instead find that performance in
the two memory tasks is uncorrelated or even produce a nega-
tive correlation, this would suggest that enhancements of memory
due to value are driven by separable reward-based modulations of
different kinds of memory.
In a second pair of experiments, we asked if the enhancement
of explicit memory due to reward value would persist if items with
previously learned reward values were re-studied in a new context.
Participants in Experiments 2a and 2b were first given the same
value-learning task as in Experiment 1. Following this, participants
were asked to study several lists composed of previously learned
high- and low-value words, as well as new items, in an unrewarded
free-recall task. In this free-recall task, participants had to dis-
regard their memory for items from the value-learning task and
instead, confine their memory retrieval to only the most recently
studied list (a specific, temporally defined context). Experiments
2a and 2b were identical except that a faster presentation rate
was used in Experiment 2b to test whether the results of Experi-
ment 2a could be due to time-consuming processes applied during
study, such as deliberate encoding of reward value. Because the
list length was short (nine words per list), we expected that total
probability of recall might not be a sensitive enough measure;
we therefore additionally examined output order and intrusion
rates to test whether high- or low-value items were remembered
better.
According to the reward-maximization hypothesis,participants
devote more resources to learning higher-value items than lower-
value items. This should generalize to learning in a new context
(determining whether an item was presented within a specific
context), which leads to the prediction that free recall will be
enhanced for high-value words in Experiments 2a and 2b. Accord-
ing to the value-interference hypothesis, cognitive resources may
be diverted to high-value items, and this is at the expense of atten-
tion to other related information, including the list context. Thus,
the value-interference hypothesis leads to the prediction that free
recall will be worse for high-value items, and that high-value items
will be intruded more than low-value items (due to failures of list
discrimination).
2. EXPERIMENT 1
2.1. METHODS
2.1.1. Participants
A total of 99 introductory psychology students at the University
of Alberta participated for partial fulfillment of course credit. Five
participants were excluded due to machine error. All participants
had learned English before the age of six and were comfortable
typing. Participants gave written informed consent prior to the
study, which was approved by a University of Alberta Research
Ethics Board.
2.1.2. Materials
Words were selected from the MRC Psycholinguistic database
(Wilson, 1988). Imageability and word frequency were all held at
mid-levels and all words had six to seven letters and exactly two syl-
lables. We additionally used the Affective Norms for English Words
(ANEW; Bradley and Lang, 1999) to exclude words with moder-
ately arousing, positive, or negative emotional connotations1 (e.g.,
“assault,”“hatred,”and“heaven”) which could interfere with learn-
ing reward values (e.g., participants may find it difficult to learn
that “hatred” is a high-value word, or that “heaven” is a low-value
word). Two words were removed manually as they were deemed
by the authors to be emotional in nature, but were not included in
ANEW (e.g., “terror,” “regret”). A total of 21 words were excluded
this way, and the final word pool consisted of 160 words (Table 1
reports word pool properties).
For the lexical decision phase, 160 pronounceable non-words
were generated with the LINGUA non-word generator (Westbury
et al., 2007), using a pre-compiled word frequency dictionary
(Shaoul and Westbury, 2006). To match the length of the non-
words to the words, we generated 87 six-letter and 73 seven-letter
non-words.
1Our criteria regarding the ANEW were to exclude words with an arousal rating
greater than 5.5 scored on a scale from 1 (not arousing) to 9 (highly arousing), and
a valence rating (also on a scale from 1 to 9) of either (a) less than 4 (negative), or
(b) greater than 7 (positive). Note that we chose to keep two words that did meet
the exclusion criteria: “dancer” and “rescue.”
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Table 1 |Word pool statistics, as obtained from the MRC
Psycholinguistic database (Wilson, 1988).
Concreteness Imageability Word
frequency
Word
length
Number of
syllables
Mean 439 467 22 6.46 2
SD 99 80 12 0.50 0
Min 243 248 7 6 2
Max 580 578 52 7 2
2.1.3. Procedure
Prior to the experiment, participants were informed that the exper-
iment was a “word choice task,” and that they would receive a
payment proportional to the total points earned in the value-
learning task of the experiment, in addition to their partial course
credit.
The experiment consisted of a sequence of four tasks: value-
learning, lexical decision, free recall, and a value-judgment task.
Participants were not provided with details of the subsequent task
until the current task was completed.
2.1.3.1. Value learning. Participants were shown two words on
the computer screen simultaneously. Words were selected at ran-
dom from our word pool of 160 words. Participants were to choose
one of the two words in each choice set by pressing the “Z” or “/”
key of a computer keyboard to choose the word presented on the
left or right side of the computer screen, respectively.
For each participant, 36 words were randomly selected from the
word pool, and each word was randomly assigned to one of two
reward values: 1 or 10 points (low- or high-value, respectively).
Trial choices were pseudorandomly generated, with each word
used one time per choice set, but each set always consisted of one
high- and one low-value word. This constraint was not revealed to
the participant. After each choice, the participant saw the reward
in the center of the screen for 2000 ms; if they chose a high-value
word, an image of a pile of coins was presented; if they chose a low-
value word, an image of a penny was presented. The participant’s
current point balance was continually presented at the bottom
of the screen throughout the duration of the value-learning task.
There was no time limit on the choices and participants were given
a 1000-ms delay before the next choice.
Training consisted of 18 choice sets per block for 13 blocks. At
the end of the session, participants were paid $1.00 for every 500
points earned during the value-learning task, rounded up to the
nearest 25-cent amount. Participants earned between $3.25 and
$5.00 in this task.
2.1.3.2. Lexical decision. An additional 18 words, selected at
random from the same pool as the trained words, were included
as new words. Participants were asked to judge the lexical status
of 108 items: 36 trained words, 18 new words, and 54 non-words.
Each item was presented for up to 10,000 ms, and the participant
pressed either “Z” on the computer keyboard to indicate that the
item was a proper English word, or “/” to indicate that the item was
a not a word. A fixation cross (“+”) was presented for 1000 ms to
separate each decision prompt.
The 108 items were preceded by eight practice items (four
words/four non-words) to attenuate a possible recency effect over
the last words from the preceding value-learning task.
2.1.3.3. Free recall. In a final free-recall task, participants were
given 5 min. to recall all of the words they could remember from
the study, in any order. Participants were asked to type out their
responses, terminated with the ENTER key. After each response,
a blank screen was presented for 500 ms. Repeated recalls of the
same words were ignored.
2.1.3.4. Value judgment. To measure participants’ explicit
memory of the reward values for each item, we included a value-
judgment task following free recall. At the end of the experiment,
participants were presented with each of the words previously
shown in the value-learning task, one at a time, and asked to judge
how many points each word had been worth in the initial value-
learning task. Participants were told to press the “Z” key if they
thought the word was worth 1 point, or “/” for 10 points.
2.1.4. Data analysis
Effects were considered significant based on an alpha level of 0.05.
For response time analyses, only correct responses were analyzed.
Response time analyses were conducted on the within-subject
median response time for each condition.
For lexical decision, only responses made between 200 ms and
the individual participant’s mean plus 3 SD were included in the
analysis (0.61% trials excluded).
2.2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Accuracy in the value-learning task was measured as the propor-
tion of trials on which the participant chose the high-value word.
This measure began at chance, as the participant could not know
which was the high-value word. In the last block of the value-
learning task, accuracy was significantly greater than chance and
near ceiling [M ± 0.95 CI= 0.94± 0.02 correct; t (93)= 37.34,
p< 0.001] (Figure 1A).
Lexical decision was significantly more accurate for the pre-
viously rewarded old words than for the untrained, new words
[t (93)= 6.94, p< 0.001; old words: 0.99± 0.03 correct; new
words: 0.95± 0.14 correct]. Participants also identified the old
words significantly faster than the new words [t (93)= 12.77,
p< 0.001, M (new)= 708± 12 ms; M (old)= 591± 8 ms]. There
was no difference between accuracy for high- and low-
value words [t (93)= 0.00, p> 0.1; high value: 0.99± 0.04
correct; low-value: 0.99± 0.04 correct]. Importantly, high-
value words were identified significantly faster than low-
value words [t (93)= 2.42, p< 0.05; M (high)= 584± 9 ms;
M (low)= 599± 8 ms] (Figure 2A). Thus, trained words were
primed, and high-value words were primed more than low-value
words, a novel finding that suggests that reward value can influence
implicit memory.
Probability of free recall (Figure 2B) was greater for high-
value words than low-value words [t (93)= 4.40, p< 0.001;
M (high)= 0.50± 0.04; M (low)= 0.40± 0.03]. “New” words
(from the lexical decision task) were also recalled, but far less often
than the previously rewarded words [t (93)= 23.80, p< 0.001;
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FIGURE 1 |Value-learning task results in Experiments 1 (A), 2a (B), and
2b (C). Performance is shown as the probability of choosing the high-value
word over the low-value word in each of the learning blocks 1 to 13. Chance
probability of choosing the high-value word is indicated by the dashed line.
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals around the mean, corrected for
inter-individual differences (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
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FIGURE 2 | Performance in the memory tasks in Experiment 1. (A)
Response times from the lexical decision task. (B) Proportion of total words
recalled from the free recall task. “High” and “Low” represent the high-
and low-value words, respectively. “New” represents words first used in
the lexical decision task, that were not present in the value-learning task.
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals, corrected for inter-individual
differences (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
M (new)= 0.06± 0.01; M (old)= 0.45± 0.03]. Thus, value also
influenced explicit memory retrieval, replicating prior findings.
We next asked if the memory effects of value depended on the
level of performance during value training. However, the asymp-
totic accuracy in the value-learning task (averaged over the last
four trials) did not correlate significantly with the value effects on
both memory tests [both p’s> 0.1].
In the value-judgment task, participants rated the value
of the previously rewarded words much better than chance
[M = 0.87± 0.03 correct; t (93)= 25.65, p< 0.001]. The accuracy
of judgments was similar for high-value words [M (high)= 0.88±
0.03 correct] and low-value words [M (low)= 0.87± 0.03 correct;
t (93)= 1.16,p> 0.1]. That is, participants had substantial, though
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not perfect, explicit memory for the value of both high and low-
value words. In the value-learning task, because all responses were
a choice between a high- and a low-value item, those responses
cannot be used to determine whether high and low values were
learned to the same level. In the value-judgment task, items were
judged individually; thus, the near-equivalence of value judgments
of high- and low-value items suggests that participants learned
the values of high- and low-value words equally well. This rules
out the possibility that participants simply remembered the high-
value words better because they performed the value-learning task
better for high- than low-value items. It could further be argued
that the value judgments for both types of items could have been
based on memory for high-value items alone: A participant then
would decide to judge a high-value item as “high” based on their
memory for that item’s value, but to judge all items for which they
had no such memory as a “low” item. That is, value judgments
would be made on a single value dimension. If only the strength
of memory for high-value items was used to make judgments along
this dimension, high-value words could be correctly classified as
high (those with sufficient high-value item-memory strength),
low-value words could be correctly classified as low (those with
insufficient high-value memory strength), and high-value words
could be incorrectly classified as low (those with insufficient high-
value memory strength). However, low-value words could not be
incorrectly classified as high-value words this way. As reported, we
did observe such errors in 13.2% of the low-value words. Note also
that the probability of judging a low item as high was quite close
to the probability of judging a high item as low (12.5%). Thus,
regardless whether participants are basing their choices on a sin-
gular value dimension, they are doing so with the same accuracy
for low as for high items. This suggests that the quality of memory
(i.e., variance in memory strength for both word types along a
value dimension) is equivalent for both types of words.
One plausible explanation of our results is that, instead of
value, our effects on memory are due to choice behavior: the
more often a participant chose an item during value-learning, the
more they remembered that item in the later memory tests (see
Weber and Johnson, 2006). Since choice frequency and value are
highly confounded (i.e., the task requires choosing high over low-
value items), a combined correlation spanning all items would
not be possible either. As an alternative, we calculated choice
frequency as the mean number of times a participant chose a
high-value item, across all 13 blocks of the value-learning task,
minus the mean number of times they chose a low-value item: Dif-
fCF=mean[choice frequency (H )]−mean[choice frequency (L)].
DiffCF thus measures a participant’s bias toward choosing high-
over low-value words. DiffCF is, of course, expected to be
highly correlated with accuracy, since participants are indeed
asked to choose high items and to avoid low items. Confirm-
ing this, the correlation between participants’ accuracy in the
value-training task and the DiffCF measures was highly signifi-
cant [ρ(93)= 0.48, p< 0.001]. To rule out that choice frequency
significantly co-varied with our effects of value on implicit-
and explicit-memory, we then correlated DiffCF with: (a) the
effect of value on lexical decision performance (the normal-
ized difference in response times due to reward value: Dif-
fLD= [RT (low)−RT (high)]/0.5[RT (low)+RT (high)]; (b) the
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FIGURE 3 | Correlation between lexical decision and free recall tasks in
Experiment 1 [ρ(93)=−0.20, p<0.05].The lexical decision measure was
the facilitation of high-value words compared to low-value words (difference
in response time) divided by the participants’ average response time. The
free recall measure was the proportion of recalled words that were high
value, divided by the total number of words recalled from the value-learning
task. Each dot represents an individual participant.
effect of value on free-recall performance, DiffFR= proportion
of recalled high-value words, divided by the total number of
words recalled. DiffCF correlated with neither the effect of reward
value on implicit memory, nor the effect of reward value on
explicit memory [lexical decision: ρ(93)= 0.075, p> 0.1; free
recall: ρ(93)= 0.074, p> 0.1]. Thus, the bias to choose high over
low-value words in the value-learning task did not account for
the effects of reward value on implicit- or explicit-memory. This
is consistent with Madan and Spetch (2012), who also ruled out
choice frequency as a possible determining factor of subsequent
memory with a similar training procedure.
Next, we asked whether the effects of reward value on our two
memory tests were related, explaining common variance across
participants, or unrelated, explaining different subject variabil-
ity. Participants who demonstrated greater value-based facilitation
in lexical decision had less value-based facilitation in free recall
[ρ(93)=−0.20, p< 0.05] (Figure 3). The fact that a positive cor-
relation was not observed suggests that there are at least two partly
dissociable mechanisms by which value can influence memory.
Because lexical decision always preceded final free recall, we
were concerned that the negative correlation between the two
value-based facilitation effects on memory could be due to the
influence of lexical decision on free recall. If a word had a long
response time in lexical decision, perhaps that would correspond
to increased encoding of the word; a poor lexical decision response
might then turn into an increased probability of free recall. We
tested for this kind of effect with within-subjects analyses. We
compared lexical decision response times for words that were or
were not free recalled, separately for high- and low-value words.
Lexical decision response times were not significantly different
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between later recalled and later not recalled words [high value:
t (93)= 1.13, p> 0.1, Cohen’s d = 0.07; low-value: t (93)= 0.60,
p> 0.1, d = 0.04]. Thus, the effect of an item’s value on explicit
memory is not explainable by its effect on implicit memory, or
vice versa, and this rules out explanations due to the fixed task
order, i.e., the possibility that the negative correlation between
value-based facilitation effects was merely due to further encoding
during lexical decision. Instead, we found no relationship between
lexical decision time for an item and its later recall probability,
in line with our previous interpretation of the between-subjects
correlations: the enhancements in the two tasks were driven by
different mechanisms.
We had not expected the negative correlation between the
effects of value on implicit- and explicit-memory. In an attempt
to derive an explanation post hoc, we took a closer look at our
data. Perhaps the observed negative correlation between implicit-
and explicit-memory had been driven by differences in partici-
pants’ learning strategies in the value-learning task (even though,
as reported above, the asymptotic accuracy in the value-learning
task did not correlate significantly with the value effects on the
two memory tests). We speculated that participants who learned
values earlier may be the ones who showed greater effects of value
on implicit memory, because they would have had a larger num-
ber of trials on which they knew the correct values. In contrast,
participant who took longer to learn presumably found the value-
learning task more challenging early on; for these participants,
value may have been used more as a deliberate retrieval cue in
later explicit memory. For this purpose, we measured how long
it took for participants to reach an 80% accuracy criterion in
the value-training task (i.e., trials-to-criterion, TTC: choosing the
high-value item on 80% of all trials within a block). We then
correlated TTC with reward effects on the lexical decision task
(DiffLD) and with reward effects on free recall (DiffFR). Note
that 6 participants never reached the 80% accuracy criterion; for
these participants, the TTC was set to 14, i.e., one greater than
the actual number of trial blocks presented in the value-learning
task. This correction to the TTC measure served to denote that
these participants required more learning trials to reach 80% accu-
racy. In line with our reasoning, we found that participants who
reached the learning criterion earlier exhibited stronger implicit
memory effects due to reward value (i.e., greater priming in the
lexical decision task, DiffLD) [ρ(93)=− 0.22,p< 0.05]. This may
provide evidence that participants who had learned items val-
ues earlier (fewer trials-to-criterion) had more trials on which to
accumulate value learning, which then enhanced implicit mem-
ory for high-value items. Complementing this result, we found
that participants who took longer to reach the learning crite-
rion exhibited stronger explicit memory effects due to reward
value (i.e., greater difference in recall probabilities in the free-
recall task, DiffFR) [ρ(93)= 0.24, p< 0.05]. This is consistent
with the idea that participants for whom value learning was ini-
tially more challenging may have used value more as an explicit
memory cue in free recall. Further, when controlling for trials-to-
criterion in a partial correlation analysis, the negative correlation
between the effects of value on lexical decision and free recall
was no longer negative, and far from significant [ρp(93)= 0.040,
p> 0.1]. Although our specific interpretation is post hoc and
should be considered with caution, the results of this analysis
at least suggest that the way people learned the values initially
mediated the mutually exclusive effects of value on implicit- and
explicit-memory.
2.3. SUMMARY
Experiment 1 revealed that high-value words were subsequently
remembered better than low-value words in both implicit- and
explicit-unrewarded memory tests. The effect of value on mem-
ory in these two memory tasks was slightly negatively correlated,
suggesting the presence of at least two mechanisms mediating the
memory enhancement by reward value, rather a global enhance-
ment of memory due reward value. Different initial value-learning
strategies may have contributed to this negative correlation.
The enhancement of implicit memory by value (i.e., an acces-
sibility bias for high-value items), is a finding without direct
previous evidence. Although the influence of reward value on
response time in our lexical decision task was relatively small
(∼15 ms), this is consistent with studies that presented a reward
cue in monetary incentive tasks and found that reward value facil-
itated response time by∼20 ms (Abler et al., 2005; Sescousse et al.,
2010; Staudinger et al., 2011). Furthermore, nearly all prior studies
demonstrating the reward-based enhancement of memory used
procedures that led to the deliberate prioritization of encoding
due to reward value. Here we used a procedure where participants
incrementally learned values and found the enhancement of both
implicit- and explicit-memory due to reward value. Because the
memory tests were unrewarded, and no prioritization instructions
were given, this suggests that not only can participants priori-
tize when asked to, but they exhibit a bias to learn high-value
words better than low-value words. Such a bias may serve them
well in naturalistic situations, in which items usually retain their
value.
3. EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B
We next asked whether the high-value item advantage observed
following training in Experiment 1 would extend to a new learn-
ing situation involving the reward-value-trained items. Having
established that the value-learning procedure in Experiment 1 can
enhance explicit memory due to reward value, we used the same
procedure to test for effects of reward value on new learning involv-
ing value-trained words in a different context. Following training
as in Experiment 1 and a distractor task, we had participants learn
word lists consisting of trained words and untrained words. In a
study/test procedure, participants viewed each new list, followed
by delayed free recall.
As in Experiment 1, our dependent measure in the free-recall
task was the proportion of words recalled of each word type (high
value, low value, or new). However, proportion of recalls is a rather
coarse measure of memory, as it collapses across all responses given
by a participant on a list. Apart from being a test of item retriev-
ability, free recall is also a test of associations between items and
a specific list context. In other words, words output earlier in free
recall represent the items that are easier to retrieve and also have
the strongest associations with the current target-list context (e.g.,
Bjork and Whitten, 1974; Crowder, 1976; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin,
1981; Howard and Kahana, 1999; Brown et al., 2007). Likewise, late
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in the recall sequence, responses are more likely guesses. Thus, in
addition to recall accuracy, we tested if any word type (high value,
low value, and new) was recalled significantly earlier or later than
any other word type.
We considered two hypotheses: our reward-maximization
hypothesis led to the prediction that participants will recall more
high-value than low-value words, due to prioritized study of the
words that had the high values previously, similar to previous
studies finding an enhancement of memory due to reward value
when rewards are earned for successful memory performance (e.g.,
Castel et al., 2002; Adcock et al., 2006). This hypothesis is also
suggested by investigations of the effects of emotional arousal on
memory, such as Hadley and MacKay’s (2006) priority-binding
hypothesis which proposes an enhancement of contextual binding
due to arousal (also see Siddiqui and Unsworth, 2011). Alter-
natively, our value-interference hypothesis led to the opposite
prediction: Words with a previously acquired high reward value
will be harder to learn and remember in a new context than words
with a low-reward value if higher values direct attention toward
the high-value items themselves, but away from other pertinent
information. This hypothesis also suggests that for the high-value
words, participants will find it difficult to constrain their mem-
ory retrieval processes to just the list context of the most recently
studied list and will instead erroneously recall more high-value
words than low-value words. This hypothesis is based on stud-
ies finding an impairment of new associative memories between
cues that had previously been predictive of emotionally arous-
ing information (Mather and Knight, 2008; Novak and Mather,
2009; Sakaki et al., 2011; Nashiro et al., 2012). For example,
Mather and Knight (2008), found that participants had more
difficulty learning new associations between sounds/faces and
nearby presented digits (and other contextual information), if
the sounds/faces had initially been paired with negative images,
an effect that did not occur when they had been paired initially
with neutral images. This suggests, emotional arousal may have
interfered with participants’ ability to learn subsequent associa-
tions. Furthermore, Novak and Mather (2009) had participants
learn screen locations for neutral and negative images. When
locations for individual pictures remained the same over sev-
eral study–test cycles, participants made more location memory
errors for emotional than neutral images in later cycles. Thus,
an initial incorrect association between an emotional picture
and a location may have led to more interference with learn-
ing the correct association than an initial incorrect association
for a neutral picture. Moreover, when the locations for individ-
ual pictures were switched after three cycles, participants were
worse at updating their memory with the new locations for
negative images as opposed to neutral images. Together, these
findings imply that emotional items are more affected by proac-
tive interference from previous experience with the items, which
may present as impaired learning of new associations with such
items.
We conducted two variants of this experiment; Experiment 2b
had a faster list presentation rate, to further test whether possible
effects of previous reward value on new list learning are driven by
a time-consuming strategy applied during study (i.e., value-based
prioritization of encoding or retrieval).
3.1. METHODS
3.1.1. Participants
A total of 72 introductory psychology students at the University
of Alberta participated for partial fulfillment of course credit. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, learned
English before the age of six, and were comfortable typing. Par-
ticipants gave written informed consent prior to the study, which
was approved by a University of Alberta Research Ethics Board.
Participants never participated in more than one of Experiment
1, 2a, and 2b. Experiment 2a had 40 participants; Experiment 2b
had 32 participants.
3.1.2. Materials
The same materials as used in the training phase of Experiment 1
were used in both Experiments 2a and 2b.
Six maze puzzles were generated for the distractor task using
an online maze generator (http://www.hereandabove.com/maze/
mazeorig.form.html). Mazes were made using the generator’s
default settings.
3.1.3. Procedure
The experiment consisted of three tasks performed in a fixed
sequence: value-learning, maze distractor, and study/test free recall
of six nine-word lists. Participants were not provided with details
of the subsequent task until the current task was completed.
3.1.3.1. Value learning. The procedure was the same as in
Experiment 1.
3.1.3.2. Maze distractor. To reduce the very high level of proac-
tive interference from the value-training phase on the free-recall
phase, we included a non-verbal distractor task following value
training. Participants were given 5 min. to complete pencil-and-
paper mazes. When participants finished one maze, they were
provided with another maze. This procedure was repeated until
the 5 min. had elapsed, at which point the maze was removed
and the participant advanced to the study/test free-recall task. On
average, participants completed 2–3 mazes within the 5 min.
3.1.3.3. Study/test free recall. Participants were told to study
each list of words and that their memory for the list would be
tested, but that they would not earn any reward in this phase. Par-
ticipants first studied one practice list of 9 words from the word
pool that were excluded from analyses, and 6 experimental lists of
9 words each: 3 high-value words from the value-learning task, 3
low-value words from the value-learning task, and 3 new words
(random order of presentation in each list).
Each word was presented for 1800 or 800 ms (Experiment 2a
and 2b, respectively), after which the screen was cleared for 200 ms.
After being presented with all 9 words, participants were given a
distractor task that consisted of four equations in the form of
A+B+C= ___, where A, B, and C were randomly selected dig-
its between 2 and 8. Each equation remained in the center of the
screen for 5000 ms. The participant was asked to type the correct
answer during this fixed interval, after which the screen was cleared
for 200 ms.
After the distractor, participants were given 1 min. to recall as
many of the words from the list that they could (i.e., free recall).
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Participants were asked to type out their responses. After each
response, a blank screen was presented for 500 ms. Participants
were allowed to pause prior to the presentation of the next list.
This procedure (list encoding, math distractor, and list free recall)
was repeated for all 6 lists.
3.1.4. Data analysis
Effects were considered significant based on an alpha level of
0.05. ANOVAs are reported with Greenhouse–Geisser correc-
tion for non-sphericity where appropriate and post hoc pairwise
comparisons are Bonferroni-corrected.
Because the value-learning task consisted of 13 trials, which
means participants had 13 presentations of each stimulus, we
expected there to be a large amount of proactive interference.
As participants could not advance to the next list until the full
minute expired, we expected later responses to include a high level
of guesses. However, we were also concerned that some partici-
pants may not have understood that they were to confine their
responses to the very last list presented. Therefore, to identify such
non-compliant participants, we screened out participants who had
extremely low accuracy early in the output sequences.
We calculated the average proportion of correct recalls within
the first four responses to ensure that participants included in the
analysis attempted to recall items from the most recent list (i.e.,
that they followed instructions). We found that most participants
responded with three correct recalls in their first four responses
[Experiment 2a: M = 3.46; Experiment 2b: M = 3.32]. However,
five participants produced an average of one or fewer correct
recalls in their first four responses [Experiment 2a: two partici-
pants; Experiment 2b: three participants] and were excluded from
further analyses. Excluding these participants, the number of cor-
rect recalls in the first four responses did not substantially change
the mean correct recalls within the first four recalls of the entire
samples [Experiment 2a: M = 3.50; Experiment 2b: M = 3.35].
Similarly, total number of correct recalls did not change much
[Experiment 2a, total sample:M = 9.45; Experiment 2a, excluding
2 participants: M = 9.35; Experiment 2b, total sample: M = 9.91;
Experiment 2b, excluding 3 participants: M = 9.39]. Thus, exclu-
sion of these five participants did not substantially change the
observed recall patterns. For the remaining participants, analyses
were carried out after removing extra-experimental intrusions and
within-list repetitions.
3.2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.2.1. Value learning
The value-training data resembled the data in Experiment 1
(Figures 1B,C). Performance again began near chance, and
improved across blocks; in the last block (block 13), accuracy was
significantly greater than chance [Experiment 2a: t (37)= 31.16,
p< 0.001,M = 0.94± 0.03 correct; Experiment 2b: t (30)= 12.83,
p< 0.001, M = 0.89± 0.06 correct].
3.2.2. Study/test free recall
3.2.2.1. Proportion of words recalled. In each of Experiments
2a and 2b, we conducted repeated-measures ANOVAs on Word
Type (high value, low value, and new) on the proportion of words
recalled. Proportion recalled was defined as the average number of
correct words recalled of each word type across lists, divided by 3
A     Experiment 2a
High Low New0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P(
Re
ca
ll)
B     Experiment 2b
High Low New0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P(
Re
ca
ll)
FIGURE 4 | Correct recall rates for Experiments 2a (A) and 2b (B).
“High” and “Low” represent high- and low-value words, respectively, from
the value-learning task. “New” represents words that were not present in
the value-learning task, but only in study-test free recall. Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals, corrected for inter-individual differences (Loftus and
Masson, 1994).
(the number of words of each type in each list). The main effects of
Word Type were not significant in either experiment [Experiment
2a: F(2,67)= 1.08, p> 0.1, η2p = .03, M (high)= 0.56± 0.04,
M (low)= 0.57± 0.04, M (new)= 0.53± 0.05; Experiment 2b:
F(2,52)= 2.74, p> 0.1, η2p = .08, M (high)= 0.52± 0.05,
M (low)= 0.51± 0.06, M (new)= 0.44± 0.06] (Figure 4). The
lack of a difference in recall rates of high-value and low-value
words suggests that, by this measure, effects of previously learned
value on memory had been neutralized.
3.2.2.2. Output order. To analyze output order for each Word
Type (high value, low value, and new) directly, we borrowed the
logic of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank-sum test on the out-
put positions of each word type to derive a measure of differences
in median output position for each Word Type (as suggested by
Hubert and Levin, 1978). For each list, for each pairwise Word Type
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FIGURE 5 | Output positions in the free recall task of Experiments
2a and 2b. Probability of recall of each word type for vincentized output
position bins in the free recall task of Experiments 2a (A) and 2b
(B). “High” and “Low” represent high- and low-value words,
respectively, from the value-learning task. “New” represents words first
that were not present in the value-learning task. Solid lines and markers
represent correct responses; dashed lines with hollow markers
represent intrusion responses. Error bars were omitted for visual clarity.
(C) Plots of the Z -transformed U -statistics comparing median output
positions for high- versus low-value words in both Experiments 2a and
2b. Larger values represent later output positions. Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals.
comparison, theU -statistic wasZ -transformed and then averaged
across lists to obtain a measure for each participant. Because these
values were already Z -scores, they were then compared with a t -
test against zero for each comparison between Word Types. Partici-
pants with no recalls of a given Word Type in two or more lists were
excluded from this analyses as they did not contribute additional
information to this analysis (leavingN = 35 and 29 in Experiments
2a and 2b, respectively). In both experiments, low-value words
had significantly earlier median output positions than high-value
words [Experiment 2a: mean(ZU)= 0.14, t (34)= 2.40, p< 0.05,
d = 0.46; Experiment 2b:mean(ZU)= 0.23, t (28)= 2.35,p< 0.05,
d = 0.42] (Figure 5), suggesting that low-value words were easier
to recall. High- and low-value words did not differ significantly in
median output position relative to new words [all p’s> 0.1].
3.2.2.3. Intrusions. In Experiment 1, we found that high-value
items were more retrievable in a final free-recall test. Therefore,
participants might be more likely to guess high- than low-value
words in free recall of the 9-word lists in Experiments 2a and 2b.
If list discrimination were enhanced for high-value words, follow-
ing from the reward-maximization hypothesis,participants should
make fewer intrusions of high-value words than low-value words.
However, if participants had a more difficult time determining
whether high-value items belonged to the current list, following
from the value-interference hypothesis, then we should instead
find more intrusion responses for high-value words than for low-
value words. As words were not re-used from one list to the next,
intrusions were defined as words that were not on the target (most
recently studied) list. Intrusions could come from the training or
else from prior free-recall study lists.
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on intrusion
rates. The measure was the proportion of all responses (excluding
extra-experimental intrusions and repetitions) on a given list
that were intrusions of each word type, averaged across lists.
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Participants with fewer than three intrusions in total were excluded
from only this analysis as they provided an insufficient number of
data points (leavingN = 24 and 22 included participants in Exper-
iments 2a and 2b, respectively). The main effect of Word Type
was significant in both experiments [Experiment 2a: F(2,3,4)=
22.11, p< 0.001, η2p = .51, M (high)= 0.11± 0.03, M (low)=
0.070± 0.024, M (new)= 0.018± 0.010; Experiment 2b: F(2,3,4)
= 23.14, p< 0.001, η2p = .50, M (high)= 0.13± 0.04, M (low)=
0.081± 0.017, M (new)= 0.029± 0.018] (Figures 6A,B). High-
value words were more likely to intrude than both low-
value words [Experiment 2a: t (23)= 2.55, p< 0.05; Experiment
2b: t (21)= 3.12, p< 0.01] and new words [Experiment 2a:
t (23)= 6.73, p< 0.001; Experiment 2b: (21)= 6.00, p< 0.001].
Low-value words were also intruded more than new words [Exper-
iment 2a: t (23)= 4.64, p< 0.001; Experiment 2b: t (21)= 4.84,
p< 0.001]. This result also supports the value-interference
hypothesis, which suggested that high-value words are harder to
place uniquely within the target list (i.e., contextual binding).
Moreover, the small advantage of high-value words over low-
value words following training in Experiment 1 (ratio of ∼5:4)
evolved into a much larger ratio (∼3:2) in the intrusion rates of
Experiments 2a and 2b. If guessing were purely based on bet-
ter retrievability caused by high value and measured by final free
recall in Experiment 1, we would have expected the same ratio for
intrusion rates, as the words would inherit the same distribution
from the final free-recall data. The fact that the ratio is exagger-
ated for intrusions here suggests that this measure is influenced
by more than just item retrievability; we suggest that high-value
words were not only sampled more often as candidate responses,
but were also screened less well, and thus, were more likely to be
recalled in error.
3.3. SUMMARY
In both Experiment 2a and 2b, previously trained words were
correctly recalled at equal rates, regardless of reward value; thus,
the advantages we saw for high-value words in Experiment 1
did not carry forward to a situation in which participants had
to relearn subsets of trained words and link them to a specific,
new list context. Moreover, high-value words were output later in
the recall sequence than low-value items, and were more likely to
be retrieved erroneously (reflecting proactive interference). This
suggests that they were more weakly linked to the current-list
context, and were more difficult to accurately screen based on
recent-list membership. This pattern of findings held both for
a slower presentation rate (2 s/word in Experiment 2a) and for
a faster presentation rate (1 s/word in Experiment 2b), and the
magnitudes of the output-order and intrusion-rate effects were
similar between experiments (Figures 5 and 6). This suggests
that the effects of value unlikely result from a deliberate, effort-
ful, and time-consuming process during study (e.g., participants
deliberately diverting attention toward the low-value words). It
is more plausible that the difference between performance on
high- and low-value words was due to persisting effects of reward
value on memory from the value-learning task. This would make
current-list membership more confusable for high-value items and
screening candidate responses more difficult for high- than for
low-value items.
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FIGURE 6 | Intrusion rates during free recall in Experiments 2a (A) and
2b (B). “High” and “Low” represent high- and low-value words,
respectively, from the value-learning task. “New” represents words first
that were not present in the value-learning task. Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals, corrected for inter-individual differences (Loftus and
Masson, 1994).
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two studies, we investigated the influence of previously trained
reward value on unrewarded tests of memory. In Experiment
1, implicit memory (facilitated access in lexical decision) was
enhanced by reward value, in addition to enhanced explicit mem-
ory due to reward value (probability of recall in final free recall).
These two memory enhancements were negatively correlated
across participants, suggesting the presence of at least two mech-
anisms whereby reward value can influence memory. In Experi-
ments 2a and 2b, we found that previously learned reward values
can cause problems for contextual binding, when trained items
needed to be tied to a new, specific context (namely, belonging
to the most recent list). Low-value items were produced earlier
in recall than high-value items, and high-value items intruded
more often, suggesting that they were not effectively screened as
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belonging to the wrong list. The interactions between reward value
and memory are thus multifaceted, with implicit- and explicit-
memory being enhanced due to reward value through different
mechanisms (Experiment 1), and reward value leading to impaired
memory for contextual information (Experiments 2a and 2b).
4.1. INFLUENCE OF REWARD VALUE ON IMPLICIT- AND
EXPLICIT-MEMORY
In Experiment 1, we observed an enhancement of both explicit
and implicit memory due to reward value. Since value enhanced
both our memory measures, one may have expected that value-
learning globally enhanced all kinds of learning of high-value
items. For instance, enhanced memory could have been driven
by value solely through the recruitment of additional attentional
resources during the value-learning task: If participants paid more
attention to the high-value items than the low-value items during
this first phase, high-value items may then be more primed in lexi-
cal decision and more retrievable in free recall. Both enhancements
would then have originated from a single, global, value-learning
mechanism resulting in a high, positive correlation between the
two measures. However, implicit- and explicit-memory are sup-
ported by distinct neural pathways (e.g., Rugg et al., 1998; Schott
et al., 2005, 2006). Thus, it is also plausible that value may sepa-
rately enhance implicit- and explicit-memory, and such enhance-
ments would be uncorrelated or negatively correlated (also see
May et al., 2005; Gopie et al., 2011). Our results favored the lat-
ter hypothesis: implicit- and explicit-reward-based enhancements
were negatively correlated across participants. In other words, par-
ticipants who demonstrated greater reward value facilitation in
lexical decision had less reward facilitation in free recall. Prior
research also supports the notion of different value-based learning
strategies leading to differential engagement of between implicit-
and explicit-memory (Wimmer and Shohamy, 2011, see also Bay-
ley et al., 2005). This apparent trade-off between memory systems
due to learning strategy is also supported by research on the effects
of stress on memory, where deliberative (i.e., goal-directed) and
procedural (i.e., habit-based) learning strategies can similarly be
learned through two distinct memory systems (Schwabe and Wolf,
2011; Schwabe et al., 2011a,b,c).
One possible source of this negative correlation may be behav-
ior during the value-learning task, as suggested by the correla-
tion analyses involving the trials-to-criterion measure. Trials-to-
criterion explained the negative correlation between the effects of
reward value on implicit- and explicit-memory. We suggest that
the effects of value on implicit memory benefited from partici-
pants having more experience with the knowledge of the values of
items. That is, the earlier someone learned to prefer the high- over
the low-rewarding item during the training task, the more expo-
sures to correct pairings of their own choice and high rewards
they would have had. Such increased exposure and procedural
practice of correct response-high reward pairings could then have
selectively promoted the formation of an implicit memory bias. In
contrast, free recall is a self-cued memory task; thus, value would
be expected to influence free recall insofar as a participant includes
value as part of their retrieval cue. Participants who initially found
the value-learning task more challenging may have been oriented
more toward value during the free-recall test, thus producing a
positive relationship between trials-to-criterion and the effect of
value free recall, opposite to what was observed with the effect of
value on lexical decision. This indirect evidence of two distinct
value-learning mechanisms may be related to similar dissocia-
tions in probabilistic value-learning strategies reported by others
(Humphreys et al., 1968; Allen and Estes, 1972; Estes, 1972; Medin,
1972a).
Although lexical decision and free recall test implicit- and
explicit-memory, respectively, the two tests also differ in several
other ways, so alternative interpretations of the cause of the dis-
sociation must be considered. First, the dependent measure in
lexical decision was response time, a measure of access speed;
in free recall, the dependent measure was probability of recall,
a measure that is sensitive to sampling probability and recovery
processes, as well as memory cueing processes (e.g., Raaijmakers
and Shiffrin, 1981). Our dissociation could therefore reflect differ-
ential influences of reward value on access speed versus sampling,
recovery or cueing processes. Second, participants are presented
with a copy-cue to judge in lexical decision, but in free recall, par-
ticipants must apply their own retrieval cues to generate responses.
Our dissociation could thus reflect distinct influences of reward
value on judgment processes versus item-retrieval processes (cf.
Humphreys et al., 1989). Regardless of which of these accounts is
correct, our findings extend the boundary conditions of reward-
value enhancement of memory effects, and suggest that the effect
of reward value on memory is non-unitary.
4.2. INFLUENCE OF PREVIOUSLY LEARNED REWARD VALUES ON
CONTEXTUAL BINDING
In Experiments 2a and 2b, what started as an advantage for high-
value words (evident in Experiment 1) became a disadvantage
when participants had to overcome proactive interference from
the value-training phase and learn new sets of words that included
both trained and untrained words. High- and low-value words
were recalled at equivalent rates overall, but low-value words were
produced earlier in output. High-value words were intruded more
(and even more than expected based on the final free-recall rates
of Experiment 1). These findings suggest less effective contextual
binding for high- than for low-value words. This contradicts our
reward-maximization hypothesis, and suggests that there are lim-
its to the degree to which participants are biased to modulate
their learning to maximize cumulative reward; one such limit is in
relearning high-valued items in new, specific contexts.
If the additional resources devoted to high-value items included
processing items within their context (i.e., the most recent list),
then one would also expect participants to be able to rule out
words that were recalled from previous contexts (i.e., the value-
learning task or previous lists in the free-recall task), which is
inconsistent with the elevated intrusion rate for high-value words
in Experiments 2a and 2b. Thus, our findings are more consistent
with our value-interference hypothesis, which posits that reward
value impairs contextual binding. These results are also in line
with findings obtained with manipulations of emotional arousal,
where memory for the arousing items is enhanced, but the learning
of new associations involving such items is impaired (Mather and
Knight, 2008; Novak and Mather, 2009; Sakaki et al., 2011; Nashiro
et al., 2012).
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Although positive, as well as negative emotional items can be
remembered better than emotionally neutral items (e.g., Dewhurst
and Parry, 2000; Siddiqui and Unsworth, 2011), it would be rea-
sonable to argue that the influence of reward value on memory
may be more similar to the influence of positive – not nega-
tive – emotion on memory. While many studies have found that
emotion can enhance memory for items and often impairs mem-
ory for associations, the majority of these findings used negatively
valenced emotional stimuli (Fredrickson, 1998). Whereas neg-
ative emotions lead to attentional narrowing (e.g., the weapon
focus effect; Loftus et al., 1987), positive emotion can to lead to
a broadening of attention (Fredrickson, 1998). When participants
are asked to learn associations containing emotionally positive,
negative, or neutral items, participants are often better able to learn
pairs with positive items than pairs with negative items (Zimmer-
man and Kelley, 2010; Okada et al., 2011; Pierce and Kensinger,
2011), suggesting that positive emotion can enhance participants’
ability to form associations between items. (Note that sometimes
an association-memory impairment has been observed even with
positive stimuli, e.g., Mather and Knight, 2008.) If this interpre-
tation is correct, and reward value functions similar to positive
emotionality, then one would expect reward value-based facili-
tation of free recall in Experiments 2a and 2b, inconsistent with
our results. We recently showed previously reported arousal-based
enhancements in association-memory could instead be attributed
to enhanced memory for the target items, and that this item-
memory effect can mask an underlying impairment of association-
memory (Madan et al., 2012). Thus, it is similarly possible that
prior findings regarding the effects of positive emotion on asso-
ciative learning may be composed of conflicting effects. Finally,
false memories can be viewed as failures of contextual discrimina-
tion. Emotion, both induced in the participant, and emotionality
of items, can increase rates of false memories. This has been found
for both negative and positive emotions (Storbeck and Clore, 2005;
Corson and Verrier, 2007; Dehon et al., 2010), and appears sim-
ilar to the list-discrimination problems we found for high-value
items here.
4.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVIOUS FINDINGS OF REWARD-VALUE
ENHANCEMENTS OF MEMORY
Reconsidering Raymond and O’Brien (2009) we detailed in the
Introduction, our results suggest that their findings may have
resulted from a summation of two distinct enhancement effects,
one acting on implicit and the other acting on explicit memory.
Regarding studies that have found that participants can prioritize
their memory processes based on specific item-values presented
alongside stimuli (Harley, 1965; Tarpy and Glucksberg, 1966;
Weiner and Walker, 1966; Bjork and Woodward, 1973; Eysenck
and Eysenck, 1982; Castel et al., 2002; Adcock et al., 2006; Gruber
and Otten, 2010; Kuhl et al., 2010; Soderstrom and McCabe, 2011;
Watkins and Bloom, unpublished manuscript), advantages in
recall and recognition for high-value items resemble the enhance-
ment effect we found in the final free-recall measure of Experiment
1. However, in all these studies, values were presented with items,
but participants were never asked to link those items to a new con-
text. Our findings in study/test free recall in Experiments 2a and
2b raise the possibility that if participants have to learn new lists
composed of previously prioritized items, their memory might be
compromised by the kind of value-based interference effect found
here. In particular, given that the intrusion pattern was the largest
effect we observed in Experiments 2a and 2b, we would predict that
items previously linked to higher values would be intruded more –
that is, participants would continue to produce them as responses
even when inappropriate. In turn, since prioritization procedures
directly ask participants to favor high-value items, whereas our
procedure did not, it is quite possible that the list-discrimination
procedure we found for high-value words could be overcome again
if participants were asked to prioritize high-value words in later
list learning.
5. CONCLUSION
Reward value can enhance memory for higher-valued items by
increasing access speed and probability of retrieval. These dual
enhancement effects of value on implicit- and explicit-memory
measures may, in turn, be the results of dual value-learning styles.
These enhancement effects come with a side effect of a poorer abil-
ity for participants to bind high-value items uniquely to a specific
context, suggesting that items with high reward value can have a
deleterious effect on subsequent memory tasks.
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